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process of South America. It will also analyze the stances of the local actors in order to consider 
prospective scenarios, and will assess the U.S. approach to South American integration under the Obama 
administration.   
 
RESUMEN. Este artículo pretende analizar la naturaleza del conflicto generado en América del Sur por la 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The signing of a bilateral treaty between the U.S. and Colombia that allows Washington 
to use seven military bases on Colombian soil1 has provoked a political earthquake 
across South America.2 Indeed, this issue has practically hijacked the political and 
security agenda of South American relations in the second semester of 2009 and there is 
no doubt that the discussion about it has just begun.  
 
The US-Colombia Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) poses a series of important 
issues that this article seeks to analyze. Thus, it will deal with the most controversial 
aspects of the agreement regarding its content and its negotiation process. Likewise, this 
article will consider the aims pursued by the DCA’s signatory parties within the 
framework of their respective foreign policies and it will study the reaction to the 
agreement of the involved actors in South America.     
 
Furthermore, this military agreement has an unquestionable impact on the political 
integration process of South America embodied by the Union of South American 
Nations (UNASUR). In this respect, it will be also necessary to pay a special attention 
to how the foreign policy of a major external actor such as the U.S. affects the sub-
regional integration.   
 
The article will finish with several recommendations for a U.S. foreign policy which 
promotes a climate of regional cooperation in South America and seeks to neutralize the 
conflict generated by the DCA.  
 
 
II. CONTROVERSY OVER THE MILITARY AGREEMENT 
 
The perspective of a permanent and enhanced presence of American armed forces in 
Colombia has unleashed a sharp controversy in the subcontinent. The Colombian 
government in turn insists that the only goal of the new agreement is to facilitate the 
fight against terrorism and drug trafficking in Colombia. As such, President Álvaro 
Uribe maintains that all the U.S. operations will be strictly circumscribed to Colombian 
                                                           
1
 “Supplemental Agreement for Cooperation and Technical Assistance in Defense and Security between 
the Governments of the United States of America and the Republic  of Colombia”, done at Bogotá on 
October 30,2009, informally known as “U.S.-Colombia Defense Cooperation Agreement” (DCA). In 
accordance with the Article IV.1 of the DCA, “The Government of Colombia, consistent with its 
domestic law, shall cooperate with the United States to carry out mutually agreed activities within the 
framework of this Agreement by continuing to allow access to and use of its facilities at: Germán Olano 
Moreno Air Base, Palanquero; Alberto Pawells Rodríguez Air Base, Malambo; Tolemaida Military Fort, 
Nilo; Larandia Military Fort, Florencia; Capitán Luis Fernando Gómez Niño Air Base, Apiay; ARC 
Bolivar Naval Base in Cartagena; and ARC Málaga Naval Base in Bahía Málaga; and by allowing access 
to and use of other facilities and locations as may be agreed by the Parties or their Executive Agents”. 
Available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/131654.pdf (date accessed: 4 May 2009) 
2
 NEWMAN, A., “U.S.-Colombia Military Agreement Stirs Tension”, The New American, 17 August 
2009. Available at http://www.thenewamerican.com/index.php/world-mainmenu-26/south-america-
mainmenu-37/1669 (date accessed: 4 May 2010)  
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national territory.3 Likewise, the U.S. government has said that it just wants to replace 
its Forward Operating Location (FOL) of Manta (Ecuador) by having permanent access 
to these Colombian bases.4 President Barack Obama was compelled to declare himself 
expressly in favor of the agreement, arguing that  
 
"We have had a security agreement with Colombia for many years now. We have updated 
that agreement. We have no intent in establishing a U.S. military base in Colombia. This is 
continuation of assistance that we had been providing them. We have no intention of 
sending large numbers of additional troops into Colombia, and we have every interest in 
seeing Colombia and its neighbors operate peacefully".5  
 
In a similar way, the U.S. Department of State asserted that 
 
“The DCA does not permit the establishment of any U.S. base in Colombia. It ensures 
continued U.S. access to specific agreed Colombian facilities in order to undertake 
mutually agreed upon activities within Colombia. (…) All these military installations are, 
and will remain, under Colombian control. Command and control, administration, and 
security will continue to be handled by the Colombian armed forces. All activities 
conducted at or from these Colombian bases by the United States will take place only with 
the express prior approval of the Colombian government.(…) The DCA does not signal, 
anticipate, or authorize an increase in the presence of U.S. military or civilian personnel in 
Colombia”.6 
 
In sum, according to Colombia and the U.S., this new military agreement would just be 
an improved continuation of the preexisting Plan Colombia and therefore not affect the 
sovereignty of other South American countries.7 
 
Nevertheless, the content of aU.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) document 
reveals that Washington pursues a deeper strategic aim by the means of this agreement. 
                                                           
3
 “Colombia: Uribe culmina en Brasil su gira para explicar el acuerdo militar con EE.UU.”, Infolatam, 6 
August 2009. Available at 
http://www.infolatam.com/entrada/colombia_uribe_culmina_en_brasil_su_gira-15345.html (date 
accessed: 4 May 2010) 
4
 Ecuadorian Government decided not to renew its military agreement with Washington and therefore 
U.S. armed forces had to withdraw from Manta on September 18, 2009. See BENASSI, R., “EE.UU. deja 
la base de Manta”, BBC Mundo, 18 September 2009. Available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/mundo/america_latina/2009/09/090917_0238_ecuador_manta_rb.shtml (date 
accessed: 5 May 2010) 
5
 “Obama denies the U.S. plans to set military bases in Colombia”, Merco Press, 8 August 2009. 
Available at http://en.mercopress.com/2009/08/08/obama-denies-the-us-plans-to-set-military-bases-in-
colombia (date accessed: 5 May 2010) 
6
 U.S. Department of State, Office of Spokesman, “Statement on U.S.-Colombia Defense Cooperation 
Agreement”, 30 October 2009. Available at, 
http://www.america.gov/st/texttransenglish/2009/November/20091102160346eaifas0.3026806.html  (date 
accessed: 6 May 2010) 
7
 The Plan Colombia is fundamentally a program of counternarcotics and military assistance for the 
Colombian government launched in 1999 by President Andrés Pastrana and, since then, strongly 
supported by the different U.S. administrations. The Plan Colombia shows the increasing militarization of 
the U.S. policy towards Colombia in the last decades. In a similar sense, see DÍAZ RIVILLAS, B., 
“Política exterior de los EE.UU. hacia Colombia: el paquete de apoyo de 1.300 millones de dólares de 
apoyo al Plan Colombia y la región andina”, América Latina Hoy, Vol. 31, 2002, pp. 152-157. 
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According to this document, the bases may be used for regional surveillance missions. 
This implies that they could serve hegemonic purposes8:  
 
“Recently, USSOUTHCOM has become interested in establishing a location on the South 
American continent that could be used both for counter-narcotics operations and as a 
location from which mobility operations could be executed. Consequently, with the 
assistance of AMC and USTRANSCOM, USSOUTHCOM has identified Palanquero, 
Colombia (German Olano Airfield (SKPQ)), as a cooperative security location (CSL). 
From this location, nearly half of the continent can be covered by a C-17 without refueling. 
Should suitable fuel be available at the destination, a C-17 could cover the entire continent, 
with the exception of the Cape Horn region in Chile and Argentina. Until such time that 
USSOUTHCOM establishes a more robust theater engagement plan, the strategy to place a 
CSL at Palanquero should be sufficient for air mobility reach on the South American 
continent”.9 
 
In addition, the negotiation process was relatively opaque. The Colombian government 
has practically hidden the text of the treaty to the Parliament for four months, revealing 
it only in the last moment.10 The Parliament expressed its disagreement with this action 
and claimed to be competent in the signing process of this agreement. In fact, the 
Colombian Council of State considered in a consultive report that the agreement had to 
be processed by the Parliament.11 Likewise, this lack of transparency has increased the 
worry of Colombia’s neighbors, who are suspicious of the official arguments provided 
by the Colombian and the U.S. governments. As such, it is not surprising that the DCA 
has revived the specter of U.S. interventionism in regional historical narratives.12  
 
 
III. IMPLICATED ACTORS 
 
What does Colombia expect of this agreement? Colombia is looking to deepen and 
strengthen its strategic ties with the U.S. In this respect, it is evident that President 
Uribe seeks to market his country as the main ally of the U.S. in South America.  
Colombia looks to the U.S. as its essential partner regarding security issues, and in 
doing so, it has turned its back on the South American political integration process and 
                                                           
8
 See POLAND, J. L., “New Military Base in Colombia Would Spread Pentagon Reach Throughout Latin 
America”, Americas Program, CIP, 1 June 2009. Available at http://americas.irc-online.org/am/6148 
(date accessed: 18 February 2010); and POLAND, J. L. “Obama's Choice: New Documents Show United 
States Seeks Colombian Bases for Training and Operations”, Americas Program, CIP, 13 August 2009. 
Available at http://americas.irc-online.org/am/6351 (date accessed: 7 May 2010) 
9
 U.S. Air Mobility Command, White Paper, Global En Route Strategy, 1 March 2009, p. 21-22. 
Available at  http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/documents/show/46 (date accessed: 6 May 2010) 
10
 “Colombia: Gobierno entrega al Congreso texto del acuerdo firmado con EE.UU.”, Infolatam, 3 
November 2009. Available at http://www.infolatam.com/entrada.jsp?id=17014 (date accessed: 7 May 
2010) 
11
 “Gobierno colombiano no llevará al Congreso acuerdo militar con EE.UU.”, El Comercio, 26 October 
2009, Available at http://ww1.elcomercio.com/noticiaEC.asp?id_noticia=312793&id_seccion=4 (date 
accessed: 8 May 2010) 
12
 PLANAS, R. “South America Wary of U.S. Colombia Base Deal”, World Politics Review, 2 September 
2009. Available at http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/article.aspx?id=4244 (date accessed: 8 May 
2010) 
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the UNASUR. This unbalanced policy is leading Colombia to marginalization in its 
natural political environment. Although enhancing relations with the U.S. may be an 
attractive foreign policy goal, it does not seem rational to do so at the expense of 
damaging relations with its closer neighbors. The priority given to the relationship with 
the U.S. is a personal political gamble of Álvaro Uribe. Indeed, he has decided to build 
an enhanced relationship with the U.S. without seeking a consensus with the opposition 
parties. As the handling of this new military agreement shows, Colombia’s foreign 
policy reflects President Uribe’s high level of unilateralism in the decision-making 
process. 
 
As far as the U.S. is concerned, if we believe the Pentagon’s document, it seems to be 
pursuing three interrelated goals by this agreement: reaffirming its strategic position in 
the region; checking the expansionist ambitions of Caracas and its allies; and, last but 
not least, limiting the Brazilian leadership in the subcontinent. Thus, the DCA would 
lay the foundations for a U.S. hegemonic policy in South America.   
 
With the exception of Peru, the U.S.-Colombia military agreement has been received 
with deep distrust in all South America.13 Even in Colombia the agreement has 
encountered serious resistance, as indicated by the public opinion.14 Moreover, the 
opposition has strongly criticized the agreement arguing that it constitutes a violation of 
Colombia’s sovereignty.15 Very significantly, former President Ernesto Samper has 
publicly argued that the DCA is harmful to both parties.16. 
 
Colombia shares with its South American neighbors a set of deep ties (cultural, 
commercial, migratory, and security-related) which generate a strong interdependence. 
South America is thus the most important area for Colombian interests and Bogotá 
should not ignore this fact when it comes to assessing the relationship with the U.S. 
Although the U.S. is an important ally for Colombia, it cannot replace South America as 
                                                           
13
 FORERO, J., “South American Leaders Assail U.S. Access to Colombian Military Bases”, The 
Washington Post, 29 August 2009. Available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/08/28/AR2009082803768.html (date 
accessed: 8 May 2010) 
14
 In this sense, several Colombian NGOs and labor unions are campaigning against the military 
agreement, see MATIZ, G., “1.030 organizaciones sociales y políticas convocan al pueblo colombiano”, 
Kaosenlared.net, 24 August 2009, Available at http://www.kaosenlared.net/noticia/1.030-organizaciones-
sociales-politicas-convocan-pueblo-colombiano (date accessed: 8 May 2010).  
15
 The opposition is also against the immunity status that the agreement gives to the U.S. armed forces 
operating in Colombia. See “Genera incertidumbre firma de acuerdo entre Colombia y EU”, El 
Financiero, 31 October 2009. Available at  
http://www.elfinanciero.com.mx/ElFinanciero/Portal/cfpages/contentmgr.cfm?docId=225474&docTipo=
1&orderby=docid&sortby=ASC (date accessed: 9 May 2010); and “Rechaza oposición colombiana 
acuerdo militar con EU”, El Financiero, 29 October 2009. Available at 
http://www.elfinanciero.com.mx/ElFinanciero/Portal/cfpages/contentmgr.cfm?docId=225102&docTipo=
1&orderby=docid&sortby=ASC (date accessed: 9 May 2010).  
16
 SAMPER PIZANO, E., “Bases militares estadounidenses en Colombia”, El País, 12 November 2009. 
Available at 
http://www.elpais.com/articulo/opinion/Bases/militares/estadounidenses/Colombia/elpepiopi/20091112el
pepiopi_5/Tes (date accessed: 9 May 2010).  
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the cornerstone of Colombian foreign policy. Therefore the Andean country needs to 
reconsider its foreign and security policy in order to implement a more balanced one 
between its alliance with the U.S. and its natural South American ties. Colombian self-
exclusion from the South American integration process is negative for Colombia and for 
the rest of the region.   
 
In the region prevails a widespread feeling that it is time for South America to 
emancipate from U.S. influence and to become a new and independent pole of power in 
the international system.17 In this sense, it seems that the majority of Southern American 
leaders have understood that their region needs to be politically united to make its voice 
heard18. So, given this regional context, it is easy to understand why the DCA has been 
perceived as an illegitimate interference in domestic South American issues and as an 
attempt to hinder South American integration process.   
 
Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia consider the new U.S.-Colombian military agreement 
to constitute a direct threat to their national security and to South American regional 
security as a whole. For the so-called “Bolivarian axis” this agreement is a new 
expression of the historical interventionist policy of Washington towards Latin 
America. According to these countries, this policy has not changed despite the arrival of 
Obama to the White House. Caracas and its allies in the region demand a fully 
sovereign South America free of foreign troops and therefore hope the agreement never 
comes into force. This maximalist stance is also based on ideological foundations. Hugo 
Chávez, Rafael Correa and Evo Morales have seized this agreement to exacerbate their 
anti-American rhetoric, stating that there is a serious risk of war in the region.19 Thus, it 
turns out that the DCA has provided anti-American leaders with new arguments to be 
used as a tool of domestic policy inside their own countries.   
 
On the other hand, Brazil’s stance is driven more by material concerns than ideological 
ones. In a milder way than Caracas, Brazil is also opposed to the use of Colombian 
bases by the U.S. armed forces. Luis Inázio Lula da Silva’s government considers that 
the strategic balance of the region has been broken by the DCA. In this respect, it is 
essential to remember that Brazil has a clear vocation of leadership in the region and it 
is firmly betting to make progress in the political integration of the subcontinent. Given 
this context, Brasilia asserts that this agreement disrupts this political process. Brazil 
plays an essential role in the South American integration process. Thus, Brazil needs 
South America to consolidate itself as an international power and South America needs 
Brazil to become a new pole of power in the new multipolar world of the 21st century. 
Furthermore, only Brasilia’s leadership can conciliate ideological divergences in the 
                                                           
17
 In this sense, see TOKATLIAN, J. G., “Suramérica y las bases en Colombia”, El País, 21 August 2009, 
p. 23.  
18
 See SANAHUJA, J. A., “Regionalismo e integración en América Latina: balances y perspectivas”,  
Pensamiento Iberoamericano, Nº 0, 2007, pp. 75-76. 
19
 So, Chávez, using his typical grandiloquent and demagogic style, said "winds of war have begun to 
blow in South America”. See MENA, P., “Suramérica se pone en estado de alerta”, El País, 10 August 
2009. Internet, 
http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Suramerica/pone/estado/alerta/elpepuint/20090810elpepuint
_2/Tes (date accessed: 9 May 2010) 
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region, making possible a détente with the US which in turn opens the way for a more 
cooperative relationship. In recent years, Brazil has been the driving force of South 
American integration, and so its integration initiatives, such as the South American 
Council of Defense, have received a solid backing by the rest of the countries of the 
region.  
 
Finally, there is an interstate actor concerned in this crisis: UNASUR and its recently 
created Council of Defense. UNASUR embodies the newest integration process in 
South America and it is an intergovernmental organization which is undergoing a phase 
of institutional development and consolidation. In the second semester of 2009, the 
U.S.-Colombian agreement has practically monopolized UNASUR summits.20 
Consequently, Bogotá has warned that it is willing to withdraw from UNASUR in the 
case that this organization becomes a forum to criticize its sovereign foreign and 
security policy decisions.21 Indeed, the Colombian Minister of Foreign Affairs Jaime 
Bermúdez did not assist to the UNASUR summit hold in Quito on November 27, 2009. 
 
 
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR REGIONAL INTEGRATION 
 
We are faced with an issue that directly concerns the regional security and the 
geopolitical balance of South America. The permanent military presence of a world 
superpower determines the strategies of the countries of the region as it represents a 
clear limit to their projects. Furthermore, the DCA threatens the political integration 
process of South America in three ways.  
 
First, it exacerbates the border tensions between Colombia and its neighbors Venezuela 
and Ecuador, introducing a new element of friction in their complex border relationship.  
For this reason, in fighting narcoterrorism in Colombia, the U.S. must avoid getting 
involved in operations in proximity to the borders of these countries. Moreover, the 
agreement poisons the political debate and arouses nationalist feelings. As such, the 
reaction against the treaty has intensified the populist discourse regarding the threat 
posed by an external enemy, which is used as a way to distract attention from domestic 
problems. It is evident that these dynamics are notoriously harmful to a climate of 
integration. In short, U.S. military permanent presence in Colombia generates worry and 
tension in the region and puts at risk the political integration process represented by 
UNASUR.  
 
Secondly, this controversy highlights the present limits of the regional political 
integration in South America. UNASUR is a new organization of intergovernmental 
nature which has neither the competences nor the mechanisms to solve these kinds of 
                                                           
20
 U.S.-Colombia military agreement has been the most important issue in the following UNASUR 
Summits: Quito (Ecuador), August 10, 2009; Bariloche (Argentina), August 28, 2009; Quito, September 
16, 2009; Quito, November 27, 2009.    
21
 “Colombia no descarta abandonar la Unasur”, Infolatam, 16 September 2009. Available at 
http://www.infolatam.com/entrada/colombia_no_descarta_abandonar_la_unasur-16084.html (date 
accessed: 9 May 2010) 
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differences. Therefore, this institution becomes a scenario of confrontation, which 
exacerbates differences instead of solving them.22 The risk that this situation entails is 
that South American presidents lose their patience with this organization, finally 
considering it as a useless forum and carrying it into a deadlock.23  
 
Thirdly, the generalized rejection of a stable and enhanced U.S. military presence in 
Colombia reveals that there is a deep mistrust towards the U.S. in the region. Despite 
Obama’s good image in Latin America, one must not forget that anti-Americanism is a 
deeply-rooted trend in the Latin American political culture which represents a serious 
barrier to a relationship based on mutual trust. The DCA only further damages U.S. 
image in the region. It is true that it enhances American hard power (potestas) in South 
America but at the expense of its moral authority (auctoritas). This imbalance leads to a 
loss of normative power and generates rejection of U.S. global leadership. 
 
South American integration has enough endogenous problems yet (such as a strong 
nationalism in all the implied countries; a sacralization of sovereignty and a consequent 
rejection of supranationality; institutional weakness; ideological divisions; and old 
border conflicts) to add an exogenous obstacle represented by an obstructionist U.S. 
policy. Hence, the U.S. should enact a policy change in favor of South American 
integration.  
 
 
V. PROSPECTS: TOWARDS A NEW U.S. POLICY 
 
The DCA was signed on October 30, 2009 and it is in force since then.24 It is clear that 
neither Colombia nor the U.S. are willing to renounce its implementation because that 
would be interpreted as a sign of political weakness by the other concerned countries. 
Consequently, the U.S. should take the following steps in order to deactivate the 
negative implications of the agreement. First, it must give formal guarantees that the 
Colombian bases will be used only to deal with internal affairs of Colombia. In fact, the 
actual use of the bases will determine the evolution of the situation. If the U.S. 
ultimately decides to use the bases for hegemonic purposes, the prospects for instability 
will inexorably increase.  
 
Second, the U.S. must offset the negative repercussion of this agreement with a new 
political boost which prioritizes a more comprehensive approach over a narrow national 
interest one. Although a war seems actually an almost impossible scenario, one cannot 
ignore that the U.S. bases represent a new factor of instability in the region that hampers 
a cooperative climate among South American countries. On the contrary, it is clear that 
if the U.S. carries on with its hard power approach towards the subcontinent, it will be 
acting as an external spoiler of South American integration. In effect, this kind of 
                                                           
22
 BASTENIER, M. A., “Unasur: segunda vuelta”, El País, 26 August 2009, p. 6.  
23
 “Unasur: pacto militar de Colombia y EE.UU. frena avances en medidas de confianza”, Infolatam, 16 
September 2009. Available at http://www.infolatam.com/entrada.jsp?id=16085 (date accessed: 10 May 
2010) 
24
 U.S. Department of State, Office of Spokesman, op. cit.  
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approach to Latin America is politically counterproductive because it exacerbates 
ideological divisions and revives border conflicts in the region. Therefore, the U.S. 
needs to minimize the militaristic feature of its Latin American policy subordinating it 
always to a wider political-diplomatic approach.  
 
The presidential election of Barack Obama created hope for the opening of a new era in 
the U.S.-Latin America relations, remarkably improving the image of the U.S. in the 
region.25 This opportunity should not be wasted. Although it is obvious that Latin 
America in general, and South America in particular, is not a political priority for the 
White House in this term, the U.S. cannot allow itself to continue ignoring the region or 
by approaching it mainly in military terms. It is to be hoped that the delayed 
appointment of the new Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs 
Professor Arturo Valenzuela, a prominent expert on Latin American affairs, will enhance 
the diplomatic attention of the U.S. to the region.  
 
The Bush administration’s doctrinal unilateralism together with its neglect to Latin 
America seriously damaged U.S. prestige in the subcontinent. In order to reverse this 
situation, during the 2008 presidential campaign, Obama promised to create a 
partnership with Latin America.26 A review of his first year in office shows that 
progress has not been made in this sense.27 In fact, in 2009, Obama’s Latin American 
policy has run into several problems, including the coup in Honduras and the Cuban 
embargo at OAS Summit.  
 
The creation of a partnership requires that the U.S. support political integration in the 
region. In this respect, it is necessary to dismantle the idea that South American 
integration is contrary to U.S. national interests. This argument is based on an iron 
unipolarist vision of international relations that considers emergent powers as a threat 
for U.S. global primacy. This vision stubbornly ignores the constant evolution of the 
international system towards multipolarity. In this respect, the U.S. should not see an 
increasingly powerful Brazil as a rival, but as a partner to cooperate with in the solution 
of the present challenges of the hemisphere. 
 
Therefore, it is essential to show that successful South American integration, far from 
being negative, would have a beneficial impact for the U.S. in a multidimensional way. 
As Council on Foreign Relations expert Shannon O’Neill has remarked:  
 
                                                           
25
 Corporación Latinobarómetro, Informe Latinobarómetro 2009, November 2009, p. 98-99. Available at 
http://www.latinobarometro.org/ (date accessed: 22 February 2010) 
26
 See “A New Partnership for the Americas”, BarackObama.com, 2008. Available at 
http://obama.3cdn.net/f579b3802a3d35c8d5_9aymvyqpo.pdf (date accessed: 22 February 2010); and 
OBAMA, B., “Remarks of Senator Barack Obama: Renewing U.S. Leadership in the Americas”, 
BarackObama.com, Miami, Florida, 23 May 2008. Available at 
http://www.barackobama.com/2008/05/23/remarks_of_senator_barack_obam_68.php (date accessed: 10 
May 2010) 
27
 PADGETT, T., “Obama's Latin American Policy Looks Like Bush's”, Time, 3 December 2009. 
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“A European Union-style community would improve security, stability and prosperity for 
its members. On a most basic level, greater wealth and economic growth would benefit 
U.S. economic interests. But South American integration would also bring new diplomatic 
dividends, creating a stronger counterpart with which the United States might tackle areas 
of mutual concern in the Western Hemisphere, including natural disasters, climate change, 
illegal networks, and economic growth and cooperation”.28 
 
The U.S. must take into account this fact and design a strategy which decidedly favors 
South American integration. In this sense, the U.S. should commit itself to support 
regional integration in South America as it did in Europe after the Second World War. 
As is known, in the 40’s and 50’s, the U.S. acted as an external federator for Europe and 
should act in a similar way with regard to South America. Thus, Washington should 
recognize UNASUR as the primary interlocutor in the region, creating an 
institutionalized dialogue at the highest political level.29 Bilateral military agreements 
by themselves are inadequate and even counterproductive tools for building a true 
partnership. So, in order to favor integration, it is necessary to create a dynamic of 
cooperation which needs a regional and multilateral approach. 
                                                           
28
 O’NEILL, S., “The Promise and Perils of South American Integration”, World Politics Review, 12 
January 2009. Available at http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/article.aspx?id=3148 (date accessed: 10 
May 2010) Furthermore, regional integration reduces ideological differences among the implied countries 
and contributes decisively to create a structural peace. This would be clearly beneficial for South America 
and for the U.S.   
29
 The letter sent on January 19, 2010 by the U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to UNASUR Pro-
Tempore President Rafael Correa seems to go in this sense. See Embassy of Ecuador, Washington, DC, 
“U.S. agrees to open dialogue with South American nations”, 21 January 2010. Available at 
http://www.ecuador.org/blog/?p=613 (date accessed: 10 May 2010).  
